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DECONSTRUCTING SECTION 11: PUBLIC






Shortly after the Securities Act of 19331 (“1933 Act”) became law, critics
from the securities industry charged that the civil liability provisions created by
Section 11 of the Act made it excessively draconian.  Mandatory disclosure and
prospectus delivery, even pre-clearance by a federal agency, were troublesome
enough.  However, strict liability to investors for issuers, and failure of “due
diligence” liability for underwriters, accountants, officers, and directors for ma-
terial misstatements in a registration statement, were quite another matter–
making Section 11 the “bete noire,” in Louis Loss’s words, of the legislative
scheme.2  Opponents ominously warned that the legislation would dry up
American capital-raising.3  Even though they were eventually proven wrong in
that particular prediction,4 the industry was right to see the threat of private
civil liability as the engine that drives the 1933 Act.5  Estimates in the finance
literature suggest, for example, that a sizable portion of the underwriters’
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1. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1994)).
2. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION  4246 (3d ed. 1991).
3. See id.; see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 77 (2d ed. 1995).
Admittedly, Section 11 was revised in 1934 to take account of some of the concerns, but these changes
did not alter the basic thrust of the liability scheme.
4. The prediction failed even when Section 11 was eventually given a broad reading in the 1960s.
See Escott v. Barchris Const. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
5. For a seminal study on the law and economics of Section 11, see Michael Dooley, The Effects of
Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776 (1972).
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spread is a liability risk premium,6 and lawyer-disseminated fear of liability casts
a harsh shadow over the due diligence process.7
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, concerns about the relationship between
liability and capital-raising efficacy reappeared.  Large, seasoned issuers were
moving significant capital-raising transactions offshore, into the so-called Euro-
dollar market.  Delays associated with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) review and limits on publicity and marketing of domestic offerings
were blamed.  In response, the SEC introduced “short-form” registration for
large capitalization issuers via Form S-3 and modernized and expanded the
availability of shelf registration, thereby permitting large issuers to move
quickly to take advantage of market opportunities without excessive regulatory
delays.8  In the political process and in academic debates, however, the principal
risk associated with speeding up the distribution process was readily identified.
Disclosure quality is threatened by the de facto loss of opportunity for external
due diligence by underwriters and others associated with the issuance from the
time the decision to sell is made to the time securities are purchased by inves-
tors.9  Underwriters thus found themselves in a world of de jure liability if there
were misstatements or omissions; only a vague Commission rule, coupled with
some informal suggestions for ex ante “continuous due diligence” as protection,
seemed to suggest a more permissive standard of due diligence in such settings.10
Today, few suggest that we should, or can, backtrack on liberalization of the
1933 Act.11  Instead, regulatory efforts all point to the opposite: further expan-
sion of the speed and limited disclosure responsibilities associated with large
company capital-raising.12  Yet, this simply focuses all the more attention on li-
6. See, e.g., Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789,
791 (1988).  Whether this can be offered as an explanation for the “underpricing” of IPO’s is a separate
question.  See Janet C. Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are
Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 19 (1993).
7. This is not to say that some of that fear is not somewhat overstated.  See Donald C. Langevoort
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 437 (1997); Louis Loss, The Opinion, 24 BUS. LAW. 527, 530 (1969).
8. For a good discussion of this history, see Edward Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of
Underwriters Distributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
755 (1981).
9. See generally Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registra-
tion: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated
Disclosure and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1984);
Greene, supra note 8.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (2000); see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 620 (2d ed. 1997).
11. In fact, there are some who would, in the abstract, like to restore the lost discipline.  See, e.g.,
Merritt Fox, Rethinking Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 903, 912 (1997).  But
even here, recognition that liability can easily move capital-raising offshore leads scholars like Profes-
sor Fox to call for alternatives rather than restoration.  See text accompanying notes 89-91 infra.
12. The so-called “Aircraft Carrier” SEC rule proposals on reforming the public offering process
generally express support for a continuation of broad Section 11 liability.  See Securities Act Release
No. 7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (Dec. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Aircraft Carrier].  The company registration
idea derives from the report of the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Capital Formation and the
Regulatory Process, which did not recommend Section 11 reforms either.  See SEC REP. OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CAP. FORMATION & REG. PROCESSES 33 (July 24, 1996), reprinted in
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ability, and to this point, the Commission has suggested only minimal reform:
clarifying the due diligence responsibilities associated with short-form offerings
to take account of “practicability” concerns.  Indeed, to the consternation of
many, the Commission suggested expanding the kinds of issuer-generated in-
formation that would otherwise be subject to negligence-based civil liability un-
der the 1933 Act.13
This article is an effort to rethink civil liability in capital-raising transactions
by large capitalization issuers.14  After a brief digression about who should set
liability standards, the article then addresses two related questions.  The first
deals with a natural question:  Should not the primary regulatory effort for large
issuers be to assure continuous disclosure in the secondary marketplace, given
the far larger volume of such trading in that market compared to that in primary
transactions?15  Second, if we have developed a satisfactory regime of disclosure
responsibilities for this setting, what more, if anything, in terms of liability pro-
tection, is needed when such issuers sell new stock into an existing market for
their securities?
My conclusions on the first question come in a discrete series of recommen-
dations.  I think that the existing system is largely satisfactory as a conceptual
matter, although public resources for enforcing that regime are woefully lack-
ing; I would not significantly expand private rights of action for continuous dis-
closure transgressions.  I would, however, create a much more determinate ob-
ligation on the part of seasoned issuers to implement an efficient disclosure
monitoring system, an elaboration of the current obligation to have a reason-
able system of internal accounting controls found in Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the
Securities Exchange Act (“1934 Act”).  As a “carrot” to induce compliance, I
would reduce the fraud-on-the-market exposure for issuers who demonstrate
that such a system was in place and functioning.
Having made minor reforms to the 1934 Act liability structure, I would then
deconstruct Section 11 as applied to larger issuers.  The effect of this proposal
would be to retain a regime of negligence-based liability for insiders in connec-
tion with public offerings, but to substitute a scienter-based liability regime un-
[1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,834 [hereinafter Wallman Commission Re-
port].  However, concurring and dissenting members of that Committee took pains to point out that
absent Section 11 reforms, much of the effort to modernize the regulatory process will be thwarted.
For a survey of the relationship between process and liability reform issues by one of those dissenters,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate Over Company
Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143 (1995).
13. See, e.g., Richard H. Rowe, The SEC’s Aircraft Carrier Proposals, 32 REV. SEC. & COMMOD.
REG. 65 (1999).  There would be a mild expansion of Section 11 exposure.  The real threat would come
via Section 12(a)(1)a negligence-based standard for liability.  The Aircraft Carrier would require the
filing of much free-writing “sales” material and make it explicitly subject to this liability provision.  See
id.
14. Although it is a very important issue, I will not focus on the definition of “large capitalization
issuer.”  By all accounts, the definition should turn on identifying those companies with sufficient inves-
tor interest and analyst following that the properties associated with marketplace efficiency attach.
15. This is simply an elaboration on the classic question posed by Milton Cohen in his seminal arti-
cle on the structure of securities regulation.  See Milton Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1341-42 (1966).
LANGEVOORT_FMT.DOC 11/22/00  1:18 PM
48 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 3
der Rule 10b-5 for others associated with the offering.  The article ends by ask-
ing whether, drawing from what we have concluded, other 1933 Act liability re-
forms are appropriate.
II
DIGRESSION: WHO SHOULD SET THE STANDARDS?
Before turning to the substance of reform, we should consider seriously
what many scholars are recommending as a threshold jurisdictional matter:
eliminating exclusive federal jurisdiction over capital-raising disclosure stan-
dards and enforcement.  Various proposals have been advanced.  One is to as-
sign such responsibility to a securities exchange for listed companies or ex-
change-equivalent, so that the exchange would define both the substance of
required disclosure and the sanctions for violations.16  Another is to give the
same power to the various states in the United States, or to foreign countries.17
With more or less freedom, issuers could opt in to whatever locus of jurisdiction
they choose, so long as the choice was made known to investors in advance of
the offering.  Another related possibility would be to allow the SEC to retain its
role as a “form-giver” and enforcer, but then to permit companies a large
amount of freedom to opt out of federal mandatory disclosure responsibilities.
This would put the SEC into competition with other potential form-givers, pub-
lic and private, though preserving the Commission’s role with respect to actual
fraud.18
All of these proposals work from essentially the same premise.  Exclusive
federal disclosure and enforcement standard-setting, whether through legisla-
tion or rule-making, risks either politicization or law-making incompetence.
The effect of setting the standards too high is to weigh down the capital forma-
tion process except for those issuers that can easily engage in regulatory arbi-
trage by going outside of the United States to raise money.  In contrast, a sys-
tem of regulatory decentralization coupled with freedom of choice breeds
competition among regulators.  By hypothesis, issuers will choose the exchange
or state that offers the most efficient system of law.  Investors demand a rea-
sonable degree of protection and will pay less for securities issued by companies
that choose an inferior exchange or state.  Hence, exchanges or states will work
hard; after all, it is in their economic self-interest to develop optimal systems of
16. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1498-99 (1997) [here-
inafter Mahoney, Exchange as Regulator]; Adam Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999).
17. See Stephen I. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 950 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering In-
vestors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2362 (1998).
18. See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 96-97.
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regulation,19 and capital will migrate to those jurisdictions that appear to the
market to be most successful in that venture, providing effective feedback.
To be sure, there is a theoretical appeal to this sort of structure.  It resem-
bles the “race to the top” argument in state corporation law.  While that argu-
ment has rightly been criticized as inapplicable to firms that are not dependent
on the capital markets for funds and relatively insulated from the threat of hos-
tile takeovers,20 the proposals here are not immediately subject to the same cri-
tique.  Here, we are talking only about the legal regime that applies to the capi-
tal-raising transaction of a particular firm, which, by definition, is market-
sensitive.  Jurisdictions would develop reputations within investor communities,
which would be tarnished to the extent that scandals subsequently emerged and
were not remedied.
This literature has generated substantial debate,21 which I do not want to re-
visit comprehensively.  A threshold issue, of course, is whether the market
would rationally “price” competing legal regimes.22  At the very least, there
must be differentiation between widely-followed stocks and initial offerings or
those that trade in thinner markets.  All I wish to do here is to make a narrower
set of points that I do not think have received enough emphasis in the debate.
As to the capacity of the exchanges, the main point made by commentators is
whether the exchanges’ lack of legal adjudicatory capacity would undermine the
efficacy of any standards that they create.23  I share that doubt, but also fear the
exchange as a standard-setter or enforcer given the conflicting interests of its
member-owners.  To the extent that multi-service securities firms have signifi-
cant political influence at the exchanges, there is considerable tension in their
preferences.  While they seemingly have the interest in promoting issuer candor
19. For exchanges, the economic incentive of listings is obvious.  States also benefit, both directly
in the form of fees and by channeling a good bit of business to local providers of professional services
(including lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants).
20. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989).
21. For more critical perspectives on the “freedom of choice” regime, see James D. Cox, Regula-
tory Duopoly in the U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 (1999); Merritt A. Fox, Securities
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997); Ed-
mund Kitch, Competition Between Securities Markets: Good or Bad?, in THE FUTURE FOR THE
GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS 233 (Fidelis Oditah ed., 1996).
22. See Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 854-55 (1992).  Although the research on this issue is still highly pre-
liminary, there is reason to suspect that investors under-react to non-salient, low-level risks.  If so, we
might expect that investors would be largely insensitive to the question of disclosure enforcement ex-
cept, temporarily, in the aftermath of some highly salient event that calls into question the efficacy of a
particular regime.
23. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Commentary: Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities
Regulation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1517 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Commentary].  In advocating ex-
change-based regulation, Mahoney concedes this problem and suggests some need for a cooperative
effort with a sovereign entity.  See Mahoney, Exchange as Regulator, supra note 16, at 1498.  He also
suggests that the states would be appropriate enforcers.
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that comes from their status as proprietary investors and marketmakers,24 such
firms also have positions of privileged access to private information through
analyst contacts and the like that differ considerably from other investors.
Hence, they would be uncertain champions of aggressive public disclosure obli-
gations.  And, of course, they are actively involved in the securities distribution
process as underwriters.  The resulting pressures on how the exchanges formu-
late disclosure and enforcement policy would be unpredictable and not neces-
sarily conducive to the public good.  While this problem might be minimal in an
environment of intense competition for listings, the presence of such competi-
tion at the level necessary to eliminate all rent-seeking by exchange members is
by no means obvious.25
As to the states or foreign countries, my concerns are different.  One ques-
tion is whether, absent some degree of “monopolization,” individual states
would have the incentives to invest in a start-up system of securities regulation
and enforcement.  To the extent that some administrative agency or public en-
forcement is desirable, perhaps on a fairly large scale, the willingness to invest
taxpayer money on the bet that the state will be the “tournament” winner and
be able to maintain that position over time is open to question.  Beyond that,
there is also an interesting question of whether the ability to regulate offerings
of securities can be separated adequately from post-offering responsibilities and
liabilities.26  Integration of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is widely accepted today as
both a conceptual and practical necessity.  Would states then also regulate sec-
ondary trading in the issuer’s stock?  To do so would compound the resource
pre-commitment problem noted above.  Moreover, granting them the right
would presumably mean that once the issuer has chosen the site of its initial
public offering, it would effectively be locked into that jurisdiction unless its
shareholders have consented to exit.  That would be acceptable if we assume
that there would be an active migration via shareholder voting to innovative ju-
risdictions.  But I would predict a high degree of path-dependency here.  The
state or states that win the competition early on, for whatever reason, will have
a decided advantage in their ability to expend resources, build a regulatory in-
frastructure, and generate a reasonable degree of confidence and stability in its
system.  Having taken this lead, however, the state may well begin behaving as a
monopolist, threatening the benefits that would otherwise flow from true com-
petition.
For these reasons among others,27 I am not persuaded by even the theoreti-
cal arguments in favor of a move away from federal control over disclosure and
24. Their interest is a balanced one, of course.  They would not want to force inefficient disclosure,
or necessarily compel disclosure that would be competitively harmful to the issuer.  See Edmund W.
Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 841 (1995).
25. See Kahan, Commentary, supra note 23, at 1515.
26. See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 18, at 105-08.
27. As an entirely separate matter, I have some doubts about the ability of states to deliver success-
fully on any promise to regulate and enforce efficiently.  Internal political pressures (for example, gov-
ernment changes) constantly create situations where incumbent officials sense that they may be in a last
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enforcement in the capital-raising process.  But we need not dwell too long
here, for even under a decentralized system, the crucial question is one of de-
signing the optimal liability standards.
III
CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE LIABILITY UNDER THE 1934 ACT
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is designed to promote the integrity of
stock prices for publicly-traded issuers.28  If the 1934 Act succeeds in creating a
healthy disclosure environment, sales of securities by issuers into a pre-existing
trading market should pose minimal additional threat, and the prevailing price
will be a fair one.29  On its face, at least, the 1934 Act seems well-suited to deter
secondary-market price distortions.
Publicly traded issuers must file disclosure documents on a periodic basis.
False statements or omissions in these documents can be sanctioned by the SEC
through a variety of administrative and judicial proceedings,30 pursuant to which
the Commission can seek, among other things, civil penalties and injunctive re-
lief.  In addition, and no doubt of the most substantial in terrorem concern to
issuers, material falsity in such filings can trigger liability for fraud under Rule
10b-5, giving investors a private action for damages.  Such fraud-on-the-market
lawsuits are aided by judicially-created presumptions regarding reliance and
causation, and can lead to massive damage exposure.31 Rule 10b-5, moreover,
extends beyond required filings.  Any form of issuer publicity that is reasonably
calculated to affect the investing public can lead to the same combination of
SEC and private liability.32
Reinforcing this threat of issuer liability are a host of “secondary” liability
provisions.  Lawyers and accountants, in particular, are exposed to sanction if
they make misstatements directly to investors or willfully aid an issuer that
misleads the investing public.33  Under some circumstances, especially for ac-
period and thus choose to act in a way that might be inconsistent with the country’s reputational inter-
est as an efficient capital-raising jurisdiction.  In other words, there are agency-cost problems in the po-
litical structure.  See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 480-81 (1987).  To be sure, this problem exists at the federal level
in the United States as well.  But it would not necessarily be unreasonable to predict that such pressures
may be less at the federal level than in the states and many foreign countries.
28. I offer this as the prevailing view.  For an analysis, see Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the
Social Cost of Inaccurate Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992).  One can argue, however, that this
goal is either overstated in importance, see Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 618
(1988), or historically questionable, see Paul Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1052 (1995).
29. That is, taking into account everything except the fact of the offering, the impact on the com-
pany’s capital structure, and the intended use of the proceeds.
30. See COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 930-51.
31. See Paul Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L.
REV. 623, 648-49 (1992).
32. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); In re Ames Dep’t Store, 991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir. 1993).
33. See COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 1009-69.
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countants, this liability is sufficiently “primary” that the actors can be liable to
investors for damages under Rule 10b-5.  Even when it is secondary, the Com-
mission’s authority to bring enforcement actions against aiders and abettors,
and its ability to discipline professionals under Rule 102(e),34 would seem to add
a significant element of deterrence for those who become intimately involved in
issuer disclosure.
In addition to this legal regime are a variety of market forces that presump-
tively lead to high-quality issuer disclosure.  One is the issuer’s reputation.35  A
company that misleads investors risks a lower stock price if the fraud is discov-
ered, with a host of adverse consequences ranging from the diminished value of
executive compensation packages to a higher cost of any new capital sought
through the public markets.  Another constraint is the intense scrutiny given to
large public companies by investment analysts and the financial press.36  Such
scrutiny makes fraud much more difficult to execute successfully, dampening
the likelihood that it will occur in the first place.
Given all of the foregoing, it might seem difficult to imagine why large capi-
talization issuers would ever distort the truth and mislead investors.  Yet there
is a perception, particularly within the Commission,37 that compliance with 1934
Act disclosure requirements—and the truth-telling regime generally—is less
than it should be, which in turn fuels the fear that primary distributions into or-
ganized secondary markets can be harmful insofar as they occur at “inaccurate”
prices.
Perhaps the perception that a high degree of 1934 Act disclosure compliance
is the norm is simply wrong, and regulators have seized too readily on salient
but aberrant instances of misconduct.38  I am not so sure,39 however, for two rea-
sons.  First, the system of sanctions is woefully underenforced.  According to
conventional theory, deterrence requires an appropriate balance between the
34. Rule 102(e) gives the Commission the ability to bar professionals from practicing before it,
based either on willful violations of the securities laws, willful aiding and abetting, or violations of stan-
dards of professional responsibility.
35. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel A. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1984).
36. See id. at 676.
37. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 12, at 32.  It is hardly uncommon to see executives testify as to
some “disinterest” in their periodic filing obligations.  See, e.g., Kaufman v. Motorola Inc., [1999 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,481 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (officers admitted that they gave “less
than their full attention” to a 10-Q filing).
38. It is hardly surprising that the Commission and its staff should have a biased view of compli-
ance given their day-to-day focus on violations.
39. Before proceeding further, I will assume for purposes of argument that the disclosure rules
themselves are well-structured.  In fact, I doubt that they are–the disclosure system would benefit sub-
stantially were the Commission to expand the category of risk-related information that would have to
be disclosed promptly to investors, rather than waiting for the next 10-K or 10-Q.  But this inquiry
would take us too far away from the question of liability, so I will put it to the side.  I do expand on this
subject in Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced
Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 775 (1997) (recommending that the Commission adopt affirmative
disclosure requirements on a real-time basis, with appropriate privileges to conceal sensitive informa-
tion).
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size of the sanction and the frequency of detection and enforcement.40  I suspect
that SEC penalties are far smaller than they should be given the kinds of harm
that comes from securities fraud.  That is all the more true when we consider
what may be the most serious flaw in the entire liability scheme: that the SEC’s
investigatory resources are insufficient to detect a significant portion of securi-
ties-related misconduct.41  Furthermore, those inadequate resources must be di-
vided up in a host of areas besides seasoned issuer disclosure violations.
The SEC is forced to leave the policing of the “high end” segment of securi-
ties compliance mainly to private enforcement through class action litigation.
To be sure, the activity of the plaintiff’s bar is highly visible here.  Moreover, it
is hard to argue that the potential liability exposure for issuers in fraud-on-the-
market cases is too low.  It is large, probably excessively so, in light of the na-
ture of the underlying aggregate social harm.42  Even here, however, deterrence
is compromised to the extent that private securities litigation efforts detect or
are perceived to detect only a fraction of meritorious cases and settle those for
far less than the optimal measure of damages.  While good statistics are hard to
come by, I believe that (1) lawsuits are brought infrequently relative to the uni-
verse of potential disclosure violations;43 (2) some significant but unknown pro-
portion of those that are brought have little merit anyway; (3) recent legislative
and judicial reforms have made meritorious cases harder to bring;44 and (4) set-
tlements are too high in the low-merit cases and too low in the high-merit ones.45
Faced with this, issuers may perceive that the risk of detection and sanction in
any given case is far less than certain, and somewhat arbitrary, insofar as even
good-faith compliance can trigger litigation that has to be settled.  That situa-
tion can lead to under-precaution.
While I think that there is a good bit of substance to the foregoing, it still
does not sufficiently explain why issuers would take the risk of distortion or
40. See, e.g., Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J.
PUB. ECON. 89 (1984).  One should take note here, however, of the finding from social psychology on
criminal activity that suggests that actors are more sensitive to the probability of detection than to the
size of the sanction if caught and convicted.
41. The SEC is in a difficult public posture here.  Though it no doubt recognizes the need to seek
more resources and indeed does so, it cannot make a public concession that it is not up to the task of
regulating the markets successfully.
42. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1487, 1496 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 652-53 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Capping Damages]; Mahoney, Exchange
as Regulator, supra note 16, at 627-28.
43. This is probably a mixture of the difficulty of uncovering facts that give rise to a plausible cause
of action and the economic pressures that lead to cases being brought only when there is a fairly sizable
potential recovery.  That latter point suggests that smaller issuers will be far less susceptible to suit, and
disclosure violations that are less than dramatic will also go unremedied.  On the size biases in private
litigation, see James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the Non-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Se-
curities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 936 (1996).
44. See, e.g., Elliott I. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural
Catch-22 that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457, 498 (1998).
45. For some statistics along these lines, see FREDERICK DUNBAR & VINITA JUNJEA, RECENT
TRENDS II – WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? (1993).
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concealment, especially when they risk incurring litigation costs and the reputa-
tional threat that join with fear of actual liability.  In fact, I doubt in the abstract
that issuers very often would.  However, disclosure decisions are made by hu-
man beings, not companies.  There is ample reason to believe that these deci-
sions often diverge from what would be optimal in the long run from the is-
suer’s perspective.
One well-accepted reason pertains to agency costs.  Because of stock-based
compensation packages, company managers may have more to gain from short-
term upward distortions in the issuer’s stock price than they have to lose in the
long run as an indirect result of tainting the issuer’s reputation.  More impor-
tant, however, is the change in managerial thinking when managers sense a risk
of being fired for inadequate performance.46  Then, the “long run” largely dis-
appears from consideration, and buying time by hiding the deficiencies becomes
a rational strategy.  We might plausibly predict that these kinds of pressures
come heavily in seasoned companies that have had sufficient levels of success to
create high market expectations that, for one reason or another, become diffi-
cult to satisfy.  If that company has a demanding board of directors, the threat
becomes especially salient. 47
This could be countered, of course, by refocusing the threat of liability on
individual managers.48  On paper, managers already face serious sanctions.  To
the extent that they actually make misleading statements, they bear primary li-
ability in both SEC and private lawsuits.  They face the same exposure if they
are deemed part of a “control group” somehow responsible for the fraud.49  The
SEC has additional authority to seek penalties if their activity constitutes willful
“aiding and abetting.”50  Moreover, the Commission can seek a bar order
against culpable executives from further serving as an officer or director of a
publicly traded corporation.51
As applied, however, these potential sanctions seem to dissolve.  Private
class actions often name individual defendants as a way of creating settlement
pressure, but typically are settled with most of the funding, on average more
than 99%,52 coming from a combination of the issuer’s own treasury and its offi-
46. The classic study here is Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud
on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691.  For a recent elaboration, see
Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim
Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA  L. REV. 675, 693 (1999).
47. See Stephen P. Ferris et al., Monitoring By Directors with Multiple Board Appointments: Cor-
porate Performance and the Incidence of Securities Fraud (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Law & Contemporary Problems).
48. That is the central argument in Arlen & Carney, supra note 46, at 694.
49. According to section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, controlling persons are jointly and severally liable
for securities fraud by controlled persons, unless they demonstrate that they acted in good faith and did
not cause or induce the violation.  See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1
(1994).
50  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1994).
51. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (1994).
52. See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 42, at 648.
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cer and director insurance policy.  And, as we have seen, these class actions are
the primary enforcement mechanisms for seasoned issuer fraud.
The matter is somewhat more complicated in SEC enforcement actions.  In-
dividual sanctions are quite possible, though as we also have seen, there is a
bothersome combination of sanctions that are set too low and inadequate en-
forcement.  The bar-order process would seem to have some promise, but
courts apply it with excessive reluctance.53  Moreover, executives who fear losing
their jobs because of deficient performance have less to fear from being told
that they also might face a bar order.
To be sure, these issues could be reformed so that there is more serious at-
tention to individual, rather than, or at least in addition to, issuer liability.
While I would support this, there are limits on what can be accomplished for
two reasons.  First, insurance and indemnification can take away the pain of
many individual sanctions.54  Second, the rates of settlement of both SEC and
private actions are high.  Settlements are much easier to achieve when they do
not adversely implicate the company’s senior executives.  Lawyers bringing pri-
vate actions simply want the largest settlement they can get, and have no reason
to push toward individual liability, even if it is theoretically available.  SEC en-
forcement attorneys are under resource-driven pressures to settle as well.  To
gain a favorable settlement, those bringing the action may have to drop key ex-
ecutives entirely or limit their penalty severely.
For all these reasons, then, rational managers might take the risk of commit-
ting securities fraud.  Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, various individ-
ual and organizational biases in risk perception can also lead to disclosure fail-
ures.55  Distortions in information flow within an organization can lead to
inadequate perception of risk at the top.  Also, some kinds of risk perception
may be distorted by managerial cultures of optimism and control.  At the very
least, I suspect that individual managers, or small groups of managers, are sys-
tematically likely to overestimate the extent to which they can successfully con-
ceal some deficiency in their performance.56  They will engage in wishful think-
ing about either—or both—the likelihood that the circumstances will turn
around in a more positive director or the chance that someone will come after
them.  Here, again, the current threat of sanctions will be inadequate.
53. See, e.g., SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995) (equating standard for a bar order with that
for injunctive relief, therefore demanding a showing of likelihood of repetition of the misconduct).
54. On the role of insurance, see James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 21-37 (Autumn 1997).  At a greater extreme, bankruptcy
law can also lessen the pain of individual sanctions, which also limits the effective penalty that can be
imposed.
55. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 165 (1997)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Illusions].
56. See id.; see also ZUR SHAPIRA, RISK TAKING: A MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE (1995) (empha-
sizing that managers often assume excessive risk because they believe they can control bad outcomes if
they occur).
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A. Gatekeeping Strategies
While managers are buffered in a variety of ways from the threat of 1934
Act sanctions, there is an alternative strategy for promoting disclosure compli-
ance: to invoke third-party enforcement, thereby adding a layer of self-policing
to the system.  A variety of persons associated with issuer disclosure will not
necessarily share management’s last period incentive to deceive or its percep-
tual biases.  If they can be motivated to intervene to prevent or deter manage-
ment fraud, the opportunity for successful deception goes down.57  There are
four categories of possible intervenors to consider: executives of the issuer not
directly involved in the fraud, outside directors, accountants, and lawyers.
1. Issuers and Insiders.  The first two categories, other managers and direc-
tors, already have some incentive to intervene based on avoiding issuer liability
and the desire to bolster the issuer’s reputation.  Moreover, there are existing
legal provisions that can reach both when they indeed bear significant responsi-
bility for the wrongdoing, even though they did not commit the wrong them-
selves.  As to high-ranking executives, Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act makes con-
trolling persons liable for a fraud in both private and public actions unless they
demonstrate that they acted in good faith and did not induce the wrongdoing.
Even though this provision would probably not reach someone who was simply
negligent in not intervening, liability would likely follow for recklessness.58
Many courts have extended controlling person liability to the senior manage-
ment team that operates the issuer on a day-to-day basis.59  SEC enforcement
actions can also be effective in this setting.  An executive who deliberately ig-
nores fraudulent behavior by a colleague might be characterized as a willful
aider and abettor or, even if simply negligent, as a substantial cause of the viola-
tion in a cease-and-desist proceeding.60  Outside directors may be harder to
reach under these theories,61 but that is probably appropriate given the limited
involvement such directors usually have.  When directors are in some sense cul-
pable participants, they too can fit into the existing set of prohibitions and sanc-
tions.62
57. This is the fairly familiar “gatekeeper” strategy of regulation.  See Reinier Kraakman, Corpo-
rate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 867 (1984).
58. See Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 30 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 1994); COX
ET AL., supra note 10, at 1027-32.
59. See Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1987).
60. See Bruce Hiler & Neil Gilman, The SEC’s Use of its Cease-and-Desist Authority: A Survey, 23
SEC. REG. L.J. 235, 250-52 (1995).
61. It is a fact question as to whether an outside director has the kind of involvement that rises to
the level of control, and given the more limited involvement generally, it is probably easier for them to
show good faith.  For an illustration, see Jacobs v. Coopers & Lybrand LLP, [1999 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90, 443 (Feb. 26, 1999).
62. For a controversial proceeding charging two directors with complicity in the filing of a false re-
port where they knew the underlying facts but apparently were advised by counsel that disclosure was
adequate, see In re W.R. Grace & Co., [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85, 963 (Sept.
30, 1997).
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What is missing here, at least from the legal standpoint, is a stronger incen-
tive for the issuer’s officers and directors to implement procedures designed to
prevent 1934 Act violations.  Arguably, the existing threat of issuer liability, not
to mention reputational incentives, should be sufficient to cause this to happen.
However, I am skeptical.  It assumes much in the way of existing officer/director
incentives to monitor proactively given the demands on their time and atten-
tion.63  For this reason, there is some justification for imposing an affirmative
statutory requirement of an adequate internal controls system for disclosure ac-
curacy.  Such a requirement already exists with respect to internal accounting
controls under Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the 1934 Act; this would simply be an ex-
tension to the full range of periodic disclosure compliance.  Programs such as
these already exist in many companies, both with respect to filings and continu-
ous disclosure matters.64  The hard question, of course, has to do with the liabil-
ity consequences:  Should directors be personally liable if they fail to put an ap-
propriate control system in place?65  Questions of defining the appropriate level
of care within a particular company and establishing causation between the sys-
tem failure and the wrongdoing are highly indeterminate.  As a result, any ef-
fort to tie negligent supervisory breakdowns to officer-director fraud-on-the-
market liability could result in excessive liability, excessive precaution, and a
higher level of speculative litigation.  If so, we might want to limit enforcement
to SEC actions, for example, cease-and-desist proceedings.  On the other hand,
we should recognize once again the Commission’s limited investigatory re-
sources; sanctions must be larger than those currently in the Commission’s ar-
senal if they are to have a useful deterrent effect.  It might also be true that the
system of proportional liability that Congress introduced in 1995 could assure
that class action damages are fairly limited in “failure to prevent” settings, in
which case excessive precaution concerns would be diminished.66
In the face of this ambiguity, I would offer a simpler, “carrot-like” solution.
I have suggested elsewhere and still believe that generally, open-market securi-
63. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 46. In addition, I suspect that board insistence on preventive
steps before any wrongdoing occurs sends an awkward signal of distrust within many corporate cul-
tures.  See Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases
and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 667-72 (1997) [hereinafter, Langevoort, Episte-
mology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering].  As organized compliance programs become more the
norm, this concern diminishes considerably.  Nonetheless, there is a difference between the typical
compliance programwhich is company-wideand one dealing with disclosure compliance, which by
and large targets upper management.
64. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS BEST PRACTICES
COUNCIL, COPING WITH FRAUD AND OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITY (1998).
65. This parallels an issue under state corporation law.  See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative,
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
66. Section 21D(g) requires an allocation of proportionate fault to those persons found liable for a
securities law violation so long as they did not act with “actual knowledge” of the violation.  See Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 21(d)(g) (1994).  See Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of
Joint and Several Liability Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Li-
ability, Contribution Rights and Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1162-68 (1996) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Proportionate Liability].
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ties fraud damages should be capped.67  An alternative strategy, however—bor-
rowing from the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (“OSG”) in criminal
law—is to limit issuer damages in fraud-on-the-market cases if the issuer dem-
onstrates that it had a reasonable system of internal disclosure procedures in
place.  Here, the question would not be one of causation, and the inquiry would
simply go to the amount of liability.68  By most accounts, directors have become
much more willing to invest in compliance efforts generally in response to the
OSG.69
This approach is superior to a related alternative creating a negligence-
based system of liability for issuers, and perhaps senior executives, if their peri-
odic disclosures contain false statements or actionable omissions.  The Ameri-
can Law Institute’s Federal Securities Code, as initially drafted, contained a due
diligence requirement for false 10-Ks, but this proposal received substantial op-
position even though the measure of damages resulting from a violation would
have been capped.70  Allowing a class action to go forward without evidence of
scienter on the part of any of the issuer’s managers responsible for the disclo-
sure invites a great deal of speculative or extortionate litigation.71
2. Outsider Liability.  The suspicion that insiders have incentives or biases
to mislead, and that outside directors may not be well motivated or positioned
to counter them, has long led to the use of a variety of alternative “gatekeeper”
strategies under the securities laws.  These are strategies that enlist certain
outsiders with a strong reputational stake to certify or “bond” the accuracy of
an issuer’s disclosures.  Under the 1933 Act, underwriters and accountants are
forced to play this role, facing Section 11 liability if they fail to exercise due
diligence or ignore red flags suggesting false or misleading issuer disclosure.
Consistent with the spirit of gatekeeper liability, courts have construed the due
diligence standard to require these outsiders to play the role of “skeptic”
refusing to take management’s representations about the true state of affairs on
face value.72
The use of gatekeeper strategies is more subtle under the 1934 Act, where
accountants and lawyers are the major candidates for the assigned role.  Private
67. See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 42, at 657-62.
68. To the extent that the purpose of the full measure of damages was truly compensatory rather
than deterrent, there would be reason for concern.  See, e.g., COX ET AL., supra note 10.  However, for
reasons I have stated elsewhere, I believe that the measure of fraud on the market damages is supra-com-
pensatory.
69. Caremark has also been a motivator, see 698 A.2d at 959 (suggesting that personal liability con-
cerns are not entirely irrelevant); see also PRACTICING LAW INST., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AFTER
CAREMARK, (No. B-995) (1997).  On the design of such systems today, see Linda Trevino et al., Man-
aging Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131 (1999).
70. See FEDERAL SEC. CODE §§ 705-06 (1981).
71. Scienter-based pleading requirements are seen as a crucial means of limiting speculative fraud-
on-the-market litigation.  See Weiss & Moser, supra note 44.  On the other hand, such an approach
might be a useful approach to countering managerial biases.  See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, su-
pra note 55, at 126-29.
72. See Escott v. Barchris Const. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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liability arises for all practical purposes only upon a showing that a party was
sufficiently involved in the issuer’s disclosure to make it “primarily” liable, and
then only if that party acted with scienter.  Many courts have adopted narrow
readings of what constitutes primary liabilityexcessively so, in my view73and
at least a few have taken aim at scienter by questioning whether conventional
recklessness suffices.74  With respect to SEC enforcement, the ability to charge
secondary participants as aiders and abettors broadens the scope of liability, but
this is tied to willful misconduct.  One has to go to the administrative proceed-
ings level to find sources to go after secondary participants who act negligently.
This can be done in cease-and-desist proceedings,75 and as against accountants,
at least in disciplinary actions under Rule 102(e).76
All this can hardly be called an aggressive legal regime.  The natural ques-
tion, then, becomes whether securities regulation should try to use the threat of
liability to force more extensive external certification efforts with respect to
secondary marketplace disclosure. The purpose behind such a thought is two-
fold.  First, it recognizes the importance of disclosure for the benefit of the sec-
ondary marketplace even if the issuer is not at the time selling any securities.
Second, it reflects the increasing recognitionto be explored in more detail in-
fra—that external due diligence associated with public offerings by large issuers
is impractical, and so operates as a periodic substitute for underwriter due dili-
gence.  Merritt Fox, for instance, has suggested an external certification on an
annual basis, with sizable due diligence-based liability exposure.77  James Cox
has recommended a triennial certification.78
I find these proposals attractive in the abstract:  External certification on a
periodic basis does impose a discipline and a deterrence to the kind of “last-
period” managerial misbehavior noted earlier, and offers a helpful antidote to
internal biases in managerial risk perception.79  I am inclined toward more fre-
quent review80 on the ground that last-period problems are likely to arise within
73. The courts differ substantially on what is required for “primary” liability.  Some give it a fairly
broad reading, imposing liability essentially on those who can be called “co-authors” of the misleading
disclosure, even if they worked behind the scenes.  See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d 615 (9th
Cir. 1994).  I find this line of cases appealing.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About
Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 888-93 (1995).  How-
ever, other courts have been much more restrictive, insisting on some degree of visibility as an author
before the participant can be charged with liability.  See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d
169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1996).
74. See In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999).
75. See Hiler & Gilman, supra note 60, at 255-58.
76. See Amendments to Rule 102(e) of The Commisions Rules of Practice, Securities Act Release
No. 7,593 [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,052, at 80,843 (Oct. 19, 1998), respond-
ing to Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
77. See Fox, supra note 11, at 913-17.
78. See James D. Cox, The Fundamentals of an Electronic-Based Federal Securities Act, 75 WASH.
U. L.Q. 857, 883-86 (1997).
79. See Langevoort, Epistemology of Corporate Securities Lawyering, supra note 63, at 663-64;
Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 55, at 158-60.
80. Former SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman, for instance, has suggested that the audit function
gradually will move toward “continuous” certification of the process by which disclosure and financial
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short timeframes that can easily fall between scheduled investigations.81  The
questions are who should do the investigation, what their charge should be, and
what the liability consequences should be when there is a failure.  Lurking be-
neath all this and highly dependent on the answers to the foregoing questions is
the practical issue of whether qualified certifying institutions will be available to
do this kind of work.
If we move toward a model of annual certification of disclosure accuracy,
the initial question is whether this should be a wholly new system of certifica-
tion, as both Fox and Cox recommend, or simply an expansion of the current
annual certification required under the 1934 Act that is provided by the inde-
pendent audit.  What institution is most likely to perform well?  Due diligence
in the public offering setting is largely done by lawyers for the issuer and the
underwriters, to which is added the accountants’ expertised work.  One could
envision a similar structure under the 1934 Act.  Very little about such investi-
gation, however, requires legal, much less investment banking, knowledge.
Rather, what is required is a detailed, often industry-specific, knowledge of
business practices and likely hidden problems.  On balance, I would predict that
accountants have a sizable informational and expertise advantage in this area.82
Indeed, the auditing function has grown to encompass more fraud detection and
internal controls in recent years.83  It is not difficult to imagine that the SEC and
the accounting profession could negotiate an even more refined understanding
of the audit function that would capture much of what public-offering due dili-
gence would be if applied to the 10-K.  No doubt the accountants would want to
utilize lawyers and other professionals in this process, but they would remain in
control.
Suppose that such a disclosure audit requirement is articulated, and the
auditors failed to do an appropriate job.  What should their liability be?  With-
out any statutory change, the answer was described earlier:  They would be li-
able under Rule 10b-5, but only to the extent that they knew or recklessly disre-
garded the management fraud.  If their culpability were based simply on
recklessness, they would take advantage of proportionate liability in a private
reporting is created, matching with a move toward more continuous electronic disclosure by issuers.
See SEC’s Wallman Describes View of Technology’s Impact on Accounting, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1531 (Dec. 13, 1996).  While this substantive change is beyond the scope of this paper, it is con-
sistent with what I would propose in terms of the nature of the disclosure obligation.  See supra text ac-
companying notes 8-12.
81. This point is emphasized in Gulati, supra note 46, at 713-16.  Even with annual certifications,
there is time for such pressures to build and distort disclosure.
82. In an IPO, due diligence has a broader purpose assuring that the nature of the issuer’s business
and its attendant risks are effectively communicated to investors.  Given that issuer’s management has
little experience in disclosure, outside certification plays an important role even if we assume that the
managers are honest.  In the continuous disclosure environment, however, this role is far less impor-
tant—especially for larger issuers.  In such a setting, management fraud defined to include a broad ar-
ray of managers within an organization is the only real justification for external certification.
83. See Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures, Statements on Auditing Standards
No 82, § 316 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1997).  The report of the “Treadway Com-
mission” on financial fraud reporting was an important step in this evolution.
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action for damages.  SEC sanctions might be available for lesser forms of mis-
conduct.
An intriguing alternative, suggested by Fox, is negligence-based liability to
private investors.84  In an ideal world in which only justifiable lawsuits were
brought and courts resolved legal and factual disputes accurately, this alterna-
tive would be attractive.  Problems of extortionate litigation, hindsight bias, and
legal indeterminacy, however, suggest that auditors would reasonably demand a
sizable risk premium for engaging in this service, and might, once engaged, be
overly cautious, layering unnecessary cost on the audit function.  Of course,
proportionate liability would limit liability exposure in many cases, but the com-
fort it would offer ex ante is hard to estimate.  My preference would be to bifur-
cate liability:  Private actions could go forward, as today, only upon a showing
of scienter.  Liability for audit failures short of knowing or reckless misconduct
would occur via public enforcement.  To the extent that concerns about the
shortage of SEC resources lead one to conclude that this does not provide suffi-
cient deterrence, a second-best solution might be a negligence-based regime
with an explicit cap on damages (for example, at some multiple of the audit
fees).85
There is a risk that existing audit firms would refuse to provide the ex-
panded level of service, especially if liability exposure were relatively broad.86
There are fears that large multi-service accounting firms already find the audit
function less profitable than other lines of business, and would hesitate to coop-
erate in any expansion.  That concern is strange given that it is implicitly prem-
ised on a high level of oligopoly behavior within the accounting profession.
Normally, prices would simply rise or new entrants would emerge to provide
the appropriate level of supply.87  Were the oligopoly problem to be intractable,
the second-best move would be toward non-accountant certification, which no
doubt could appropriate a segment of the industry’s expertise in detecting man-
agement fraud.88
84. This was also the original proposal in the ALI’s Federal Securities Code.  See FEDERAL SEC.
CODE §§ 705-06 (1981).
85. In all these settings, there is the separate question of compensation for victims of financial
fraud.  My sense, however, is that in “fraud on the market” cases, at least, questions of compensation
are very much secondary to deterrence.  See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 42, at 651-62.
86. An excellent survey of the accounting profession’s concern with liability is Richard Miller &
Michael Young, Financial Reporting and Risk Management in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1987 (1997).
87. The recent “Elliott Committee” of the AICPA is actually optimistic that the accounting profes-
sion would want to expand the assurance services it offers to include certification beyond standard dis-
closure, though it does note concerns about liability as a potential barrier.  This report is available on
the AICPA web site (visited Sept. 27, 2000) <http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/index/htm>.  See also
Robert Mednick, Reinventing the Audit, 172 J. ACCT. 71, 74-75, 78 (1991).
88. In the Aircraft Carrier, the Commission sought comment on whether underwriter due diligence
in connection with an offering should be relaxed to the extent that an “independent qualified profes-
sional” did a year-end disclosure review and investigation.  Conceding that such a practice is not cur-
rently common, the Commission no doubt was seeking to encourage it.  The Commission was careful to
avoid choosing a particular kind of professional to do this job, and explicitly asked for comment about
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B. Summary
The existing 1934 Act structure would be perfectly acceptable were it to be
enforced at an optimal level.  Short of this, there is a virtue to enlisting boards
of directors to play a greater role in disclosure compliance.  Rather than insist-
ing on largely symbolic signature requirements, however, a more helpful step
would be a requirement that boards take reasonable systematic steps to assure
compliance with periodic disclosure obligations.  The best way to encourage di-
rectors to take this seriously, but not to act overcautiously, would be to limit is-
suer damages in fraud-on-the-market cases upon a showing that reasonable dis-
closure compliance procedures were in place even though they failed to prevent
the fraud.
Second, there is a virtue to annual investigation by an external “certifier”
with respect to the accuracy of the issuer’s 10-K.  On balance, I think that an
expanded conception of the audit function most efficiently satisfies this need
and would thus work effectively to merge the notions of due diligence and
audit.  As to liability, I would prefer a Rule 10b-5-based system, with a more se-
rious agency commitment to cease-and-desist and Rule 102(e) enforcement in
cases of negligence.
IV
REVISING SECTION 11: LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
The current integrated disclosure structure for 1933 Act compliance by large
issuers rests on the concept of incorporation by reference.  The company’s peri-
odic disclosure filings, for example, 10-Ks, 10-Qs and 8-Ks, are deemed part of
the registration statement, although they must be updated to reflect new infor-
mation not previously reported.  Thus, the issuer bears strict liability if any of
this incorporated disclosure information is false or misleading at the time of ef-
fectiveness, and all the other Section 11 defendants, including the underwriters,
have due diligence responsibilities with respect to it.  The recent SEC proposals
would continue this approach of broad in terrorem liability.89
There are two reasons to reconsider this policy.  First, is this system fair in
an environment that encourages issuers to act quickly in seizing windows of
marketplace opportunity to sell shares?90  This concern has existed ever since
the integrated disclosure and shelf registration rules were established in the
early 1980s.  There may be no time for serious due diligence between the deci-
sion to proceed, at which point the underwriters are selected and notified, and
the sales.  That puts everyone, but especially the underwriters, in an uncomfort-
whether a market for such services would develop, especially in the face of liability threats.  See Wall-
man Commission Report, supra note 12, at 158-59.
89. Aircraft Carrier, supra note 12, at 160 (choosing not to deregulate with respect to underwriter
liability exposure).
90. This concern is well articulated in the article by the American Bar Ass’n Comm. on the Federal
Reg. of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Seller’s Due Diligence and Similar Defenses Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 48 BUS. LAW. 1185 (1993).
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able position given the size of the liability exposure.  Rule 176 attempts to pro-
vide some comfort by suggesting that there can be some relaxation in diligence
under the circumstances, but delivers little assurance because it fails to create a
determinate safe harbor.  The effect of the discomfort is some combination of
finger-crossing during a public offering and pressure to structure capital-raising
deals in the form of Rule 144A offerings, private placements, and offshore of-
ferings in ways that avoid Section 11 exposure.  These pressures no doubt would
become even more problematic as technology expands the capital-raising op-
tions available to large companies, giving them options well beyond the conven-
tional underwritten distribution.91
The other reason to consider reform, articulated by Michael Dooley,92 and
more recently by Stephen Choi,93 is the suspicion that strict Section 11 liability
may not be cost justified, at least as applied to large capitalization issuers.  Such
issuers, they argue, have substantial reputational incentives to be candid in their
capital raising, and to select underwriters with an even greater reputational
stake in candor.  As noted earlier, the presence of widespread analyst and press
scrutiny of such issuers makes fraud that much more difficult.  None of this im-
plies that fraud will not occur on occasion, simply that it is less likely to be suc-
cessful in this context.  As such, the economic benefit from expensive, ritualistic
due diligence is reduced.  Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that is-
suers migrate toward the various, but otherwise suboptimal, alternatives to
public offerings, because Section 11 does not offer reasonable value to inves-
tors.
A. Issuers and Insiders
For reasons that were discussed earlier relating to the last period problem, I
am not convinced that reputational concerns are likely to be a sufficient check
on issuer overreaching in a public offering.  Indeed, as Mitu Gulati has argued,94
it is precisely the seasoned issuer whose management will be most sorely
tempted to engage in a public offering at an inflated price as a strategy to hold
onto their jobs and perhaps turn the company around.  Even if the company is
not in distress, there might be a temptation to inflate the company’s prospects
to the extent that high-level insiders are using registration as an occasion to sell
a sizable portion of their own shares.95
91. Though internet-based offerings currently exist only in small numbers and only for relatively
small issuers, there is ample reason to believe that it is the larger issuerwith an established reputation
among investorsthat can best take advantage of direct offerings to investors.
92. See Dooley, supra note 5, at 801.
93. See Stephen Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI.
L.  REV. 567, 567-78 (1997) [hereinafter Choi, Company Registration].
94. See Gulati, supra note 46, at 696-709.
95. Rationally, this temptation should be limited to the extent that the selling shareholders will be
retaining many of their shares.  I suspect, however, that as for many human beings, the temptation to
do what it takes to get money “now” can overwhelm longer-term incentives.
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That suggests the need to retain some system of issuer liability under Sec-
tion 11–with a strong emphasis on insider responsibility.  It would not necessar-
ily justify the prevailing system of strict liability for the issuer and due diligence
liability for signatory officers and the company’s inside directors.  After all, ac-
tual fraud is remediable under Rule 10b-5.96  Moreover, at least to the extent
that we already have a workable disclosure system under the 1934 Act, with ap-
propriate liability and enforcement, we already have deterrence targeting the
company’s periodic disclosure that, in turn, becomes the heart of disclosure on
Form S-3 and would do so as well under the Aircraft Carrier’s proposed Form
B.
Nonetheless, an internal due diligence requirement for insiders makes a
great deal of sense to me.  It is, of course, possible to have pervasive frauds in-
volving most or all of the company’s top managers in seasoned companies, but
that is rare.  Engineering a fraud that involves a large number of people is diffi-
cult and dangerous.  In many fraud cases, only a segment of senior management
will be aware of the deception.97  Sometimes, lower-level managers are involved.
As a matter of law, it is possible that the knowledge of any company agent or
employee will be attributed to the company.  However, this is not entirely clear
from a doctrinal standpoint,98 and could arguably be subject to an exception if
the employees hiding the truth are engaging in corrupt or self-serving behavior.
A due diligence obligation makes especially good sense as applied to non-
involved senior executives.  They are in the best position to assess credibility
and test the company’s weak points, and absent something like Section 11, have
no obvious legal obligation to make inquiries.99  There probably is also some so-
cial deterrence to a regime wherein if one manager hides the truth, she exposes
her peers to liability.  Furthermore, this kind of liability regime tells those in
control of the timing of the offering to forego a sale when they sense that key
information is in flux or there are red flags about the company’s situation.
For all these reasons, I would maintain the current liability regime as ap-
plied to insiders of the issuer.100  The remaining question, then, is whether strict
liability is justified for issuers, or whether the issuer should be relieved from
Section 11 liability if it can show that it implemented and applied appropriate
procedures to discover the truth and failed notwithstanding all reasonable ef-
fort.  To me, the question is a close one, and is tightly connected to the general
problem of vicarious liability.  On balance, I am persuaded that the issuer
should be liable, without regard to the actual and often hard to evaluate quality
96. The remedy is perhaps suboptimal in terms of the incidence of enforcement.  See supra text
accompanying note 31.
97. For a study of recent financial frauds, showing that the CEO engineers a large portion of them,
see Mark Beasley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997 – An Analysis of U.S. Public Com-
panies (visited Aug. 24, 2000) <http://www.aicpa.org/news/p032699b.htm>.
98. See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 55, at 126-29.
99. Socially, they are under a great deal of pressure to “look the other way.”
100. It is an interesting question as to whether this should really be “due diligence” (that is, an af-
firmative investigatory obligation) or simply a negligence-based regime (that is, a duty not to ignore red
flags).  With respect to senior managers, I doubt that the difference is all that great.
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of its monitoring, if the deception was the fault of someone in the organization,
and hence could have been prevented or detected.101
B. Outside Directors
Outside directors currently have due diligence responsibilities, but they are
the explicit beneficiaries of statutory reform in 1995 that eliminated joint and
several Section 11 liability in favor of proportionate liability, so long as they did
not actually know of the fraud.102  Although there are no decided cases on the
issue and may never be, given the dearth of Section 11 trials, one would expect
that few judges or juries would assign much of the liability load to non-complicit
outside directors.
In this light, should they have any liability exposure at all, absent knowledge
of the fraud or perhaps reckless disregard?  My sense is that little justification
exists for doing so.  The strong system of issuer liability provides a large incen-
tive in and of itself to be careful in assuring that appropriate detection and re-
porting systems are in place as a preventative measure.  Under these circum-
stances, the main impact of individual director due diligence liability may be
simply to increase the pressures for settlement of weak cases.  I would, however,
retain outside director liability directly under Section 11 when scienter can be
established, given open questions regarding who is primarily liable for fraud
under Rule 10b-5.103
C. Underwriters
Most commentators agree that an underwriter who knows or recklessly dis-
regards a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement or in-
corporated disclosures should be liable under Section 11.104  The more heavily
contested question is whether to continue to insist on due diligence liability in
short form registrations under circumstances where there is little practical op-
portunity for a de novo investigation.  The SEC’s response, initially via Rule
176 and now with proposed amendments, is “yes but.”  Underwriter liability is
maintained, but the definition of what constitutes due diligence is modified in
certain kinds of transactions to “take account of” the collapsed timing attendant
to short-form offerings.105  No court has ever been called upon to interpret Rule
176, and so it is difficult to know what level of comfort it creates.  The Commis-
101. Here, we must acknowledge that Section 11 plays a compensatory as well as deterrence role.
Under tort law generally, agency law doctrine tends to impose strict liability on a company for frauds
committed in the company’s name.  See In re Atlantic Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 784 F.2d 29, 31-32 (1st Cir.
1986).  On the general role of vicarious liability, see COX ET AL., supra note 10, at 1023-32.
102. See Langevoort, Proportionate Liability, supra note 66, at 1164.
103. That is to say, I would use a Rule 10b-5 standard for liability, but expand it so that outside di-
rectors would be liable if they were aware of the fraud but failed to act.  Such inaction would not meet
the test for “primary liability” as currently understood.  See supra text accompanying note 73.
104. But see Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 962 (1998)
[hereinafter Choi, Market Lessons].
105. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 12 at 152-60.
LANGEVOORT_FMT.DOC 11/22/00  1:18 PM
66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 3
sion, at least, believes that the current situation is satisfactory, and that mean-
ingful, if truncated, due diligence does occur in short-form offerings.  Hence,
the proposed revisions to the Rule simply expand on the kinds of steps the
Commission deems appropriate under these circumstances.
There are three stronger alternatives to consider.  One is to turn an
amended Rule 176 into a true safe harbor, providing immunity to underwriters
who follow its guidelines.  The problem with this approach is that the standards
themselves are somewhat ambiguous and open-ended, providing no obvious
roadmap to safety.  To be more determinate, they must provide protection
upon a showing that the underwriter made a good-faith effort to follow the
guidance.  While this is possible, it leaves open the question of whether the un-
derwriter due diligence liability is then so diluted that it adds little to the cause
of investor protection.  The second option is to eliminate the due diligence re-
sponsibility but retain a negligence standard for liability, making clear that the
underwriter’s duty is simply to respond to visible warning signs.  The final pos-
sibility is jettisoning underwriter liability completely, absent a showing of scien-
ter.
The key to resolving this issue is determining, from a policy standpoint, what
kind of underwriter intervention we want prior to a short-form offering.  Based
on the SEC proposals and common sense, there is good reason to expect an un-
derwriter to carefully review prior filings that would be incorporated by refer-
ence and to meet with executives of the issuer to ask questions and to examine
any further filings that would be made to update existing disclosure.  No doubt,
a part of this anticipated discussion would be to review the issuer’s internal con-
trol and disclosure procedures.  Underwriters will also likely draw on the
knowledge of investment analysts, who presumably have a fairly detailed
knowledge of the issuer and its competitive environment.
This is quite different from due diligence as conventionally understood,
which involves a form of devil’s advocacy.  This requires a second look at pri-
mary source material–for example, the re-examination of key contracts to as-
sure that managers are telling the truth.106  That is the kind of diligence that is
impracticable in short-form offerings.107  We could achieve this stepped-down
level of diligence through the establishment of a safe harbor that specifies that a
review of filings and questioning of management in light of information other-
wise available to the issuer satisfies the investigation portion of the due dili-
gence defense in Section 11(b).  However, I suspect that we would end up at ex-
actly the same place if we replaced the due diligence standard with one based
on negligence.  It is hard to imagine that underwriters would not reach that
minimal level of inquiry anyway.  They have the brokers’ “shingle theory” obli-
106. See Escott v. Barchris Const. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
107. That is, between the time of the decision to sell and the actual sales.  One could say that un-
derwriters must, constructively at least, do some sort of anticipatory due diligence.  I would suggest that
this is a role better assigned to accountants with respect to the potential for management fraud.  See
supra text accompanying note 71.
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gation to worry about, which requires some inquiry into securities being rec-
ommended,108 as well as the fear that no inquiry at all would constitute reckless
disregard under Rule 10b-5.  An SEC enforcement action under Section 17(a),
which has a negligence standard built into it,109 is also possible.  Even aside from
any legal incentives, underwriters’ concern about reputation demands some de-
gree of care before associating with a distribution.  As to the kind of informa-
tion that can be obtained from analysts, that information is presumably already
incorporated into the price of the stock for widely-followed companies.
Conceptually, I might favor one or the other of the foregoing approaches.
Yet, there is a strong practical case to be made for absolving underwriters of all
inquiry obligations short of recklessness.  Given the reputational stakes, a sub-
stantial review is likely to occur anyway, and it is questionable whether the
threat of negligence-based legal liability is really needed to get underwriters to
avoid involvement in an offering when they spot danger signs.  The downside of
a negligence standard is its indeterminacy, especially as applied in hindsight.  I
suspect that some risk premium will attach to underwritten offerings simply to
reflect the incidence of low-merit lawsuits that are brought in the hopes of judge
or jury error, or just for the settlement value.  Whatever the merits of securities
litigation reform procedures generally, they do help weed out weak scienter-
based cases.  No such procedure is as readily available for negligence cases,
given the difficulties attendant to assessing reasonableness.110  In light of the low
level of added value from underwriter involvement in short-form disclosures in
any event, there is a legitimate question about whether this cost is justifiable.  If
not, it distorts capital raising choices.
The other reason for removing non-scienter liability from underwriters has
to do with technological evolution:  It is quite probable that reputable issuers
will find means for distributing their securities in a public offering in a way that
does not employ the conventional underwriter at all.  Yet, some assistance in
the distribution may be needed (for example, through the use of internet mar-
keting), and the definition of underwriter is broad enough to cover these activi-
ties.  As underwriter involvement diminishes in significance relative to the deal
as a whole, it becomes that much more problematic to apply a negligence-based
standard in the first place.  Indeed, the threat of negligence liability could frus-
trate the development of otherwise useful, but less than full-service, capital-
raising mechanisms for large capitalization issuers.111
None of this, of course, precludes a voluntary assumption of a greater inves-
tigatory or certification obligation by an underwriter or other intermediary.  A
company that believes that investors would be more receptive to an offering if a
108. See Roberta Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1276 (1995).
109. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1979).
110. On the use of pleading restrictions in Section 11 cases, see Hillary Sale, Heightened Pleading
and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of PSLRA’s Internal Information Standard on 1933 and
1934 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 590-93  (1998).
111. See Donald Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98
HARV. L. REV. 747, 776-78 (1985).
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full due diligence investigation had been made, should be free to have the in-
termediary state the level of investigation undertaken and report its findings.
To the extent that there was a deliberate or reckless failure to do the job as de-
scribed, fraud liability under Rule 10b-5 would attach.  However, mere negli-
gence in carrying out that task would not trigger liability.112
D. Extending the Reforms: Smaller Companies and Exempt Offerings
1. IPOs and Non-World Class Issuers.  If there is a good case for revising
Section 11, should it extend to settings other than public offerings by large
capitalization issuers?  We can begin with an initial public offering (“IPO”), a
distribution by an issuer that creates public company status.  There is an
apparent reputational incentive to be truthful in such offerings, in that the
relatively youthful issuer probably intends to tap the capital marketplace
numerous times in the future.113  This aside, however, the other justifications for
deregulation do not appear.114  Companies on the verge of attaining public status
are typically not widely followed by analysts, and, because there is no pre-
existing public market, there is no market-price check on the pricing of the
distribution.  The underwriters for IPOs tend on average to be less prestigious,
though, again, they may be interested in building their reputation–and hence
quite diligent.115  Management may be less well-organized, and hence have less
than desired awareness of the company’s resources and competitive situation.
Often, founding shareholders are selling out a considerable portion of the
holdings, creating a modified last-period incentive toward overly optimistic
disclosure.  For all these reasons, strong external certification seems warranted.
The question becomes more difficult when we move to seasoned public
companies that do not meet the size standard to justify short-form registration
generally.  Because the size test is a proxy for how widely followed the company
is, and hence how efficient its market is, we are considering here companies that
are traded in markets where we have less confidence that there is an external
pricing check on managerial overreaching.  This category is quite diffuse, in-
cluding some companies that are ascending toward large-cap status, as well as
those who have never achieved much success, or whose prospects are falling,
but have nonetheless avoided extinction.  Others are stable firms in smaller or
more specialized product markets.
Without delving deeply into the appropriate standards for long versus short-
form disclosure, my sense is that the liability structure should be tied to the
regulatory judgment about how necessary special disclosure is for investor pro-
112. Stephen Choi suggests a regime that would allow underwriters to choose a liability level–pre-
sumably under a system wherein the issuer compensates it for bearing a higher level of legal risk in or-
der to achieve a greater level of credibility.  See Choi, Market Lessons, supra note 104, at 951-57.
113. See Gulati, supra note 46, at 692-99.
114. See Choi, Company Registration, supra note 93; but see Palmiter, supra note 18.
115. See Carter & Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputations, 45 J. FIN. 1045
(1990).
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tection. Arguably, though no comparable judgment is found in current law,
short-form registration might be made available for equity offerings that are in
an amount less than some percentage of the current market value of the firm’s
existing equity securities.  These limited public offerings are less likely to tempt
management to cheat.
2. Exempt Offerings.  Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Gustafson v.
Alloyd Corp.,116 most courts and commentators believed that under Section
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, issuers and persons who solicit investors on behalf of
issuers were liable for misstatements or omissions, even when the offering was
exempt from registration.  Because Section 12(a)(2) uses a negligence standard,
this was thought to impose some sort of due diligence obligations on private
offerings, though it was unclear precisely how much diligence was due.117  In
Gustafson, however, the Court employed an unusual, and for the most part
roundly criticized,118 method of statutory construction to conclude that the scope
of that section is limited to false or misleading statements in public offering
materials.
Because we are rethinking the liability structure of the 1933 Act as a con-
ceptual matter, we need not worry about the Court’s interpretive methodology.
What about the desirability of the result?  To be sure, the issue of whether a
negligence standard should apply in private offerings may be a federalism ques-
tion.119  Most states would apply the tort of negligent misrepresentation to these
kinds of sales, and the small nature of the offering typically would make state
courts a suitable forum for resolving these disputes.  That is beside the point
conceptually.  Moreover, there are certain kinds of exempt offerings that occur
on a fairly widespread, multi-state basis, such as offerings of limited partnership
interests during the 1980s,120 where there would be a virtue to federal court
resolution of the claims.
My sense is that it is the rare case where the risk of otherwise discoverable
misinformation should be on the buyers of securities rather than on the sellers;
hence, a duty of reasonable effort to discover the truth should be presumed as a
default.  This is, in essence, what the law of negligent misrepresentation does at
the level of state law, and it makes sense to extend this duty to selling interme-
diaries like brokers assisting in the private sale.121  Continuing with the state-law
116. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
117. For a good, albeit critical, discussion of Gustafson and the events leading to it, see Stephen
Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. LAW. 1231 (1995).
118. See id.; see also Edmund Kitch, Gustafson v. Alloyd Corp.: An Opinion that Did Not Write,
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 121.
119. For a more supportive view of the Gustafson result as applied to exempt offerings, see Peter
Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 45
EMORY L.J. 95 (1996); see also Palmiter, supra note 18.
120. See In re Prudential Sec., Inc., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85, 238 (Oct.
21, 1993) (deciding enforcement action against seller of high risk limited partnership interests).
121. Under the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988), the term
“seller” in Section 12(a) (applying equally, according to the courts, to both subsections (1) and (2)) ex-
tends to those who solicit on behalf of the actual seller.
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analogy, however, I would allow a waiver of this duty, if and when explicitly
contracted for by the parties.  Also as at common law, the standards for waiver
should be fairly strict:  Boilerplate waivers in mass-produced disclosure docu-




There can be no successful reform of the system of capital-raising regulation
in the United States without rethinking the liability regime.  To be sure, this is a
difficult task:  A strict system of securities fraud liability under the Securities
Act has been a signature feature of American securities regulation since the
1930s, and questioning it can easily start the process of unraveling the whole set
of assumptions under the 1933 Act.  In this sense, it is similar to insider trading
regulation, a core element of the identity of our system of regulation.122  Not-
withstanding my strong commitment to aggressive regulation generally, reform
of the sort outlined here is long overdue and can readily be accomplished in a
way that does not unnecessarily compromise investor protection.
122. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1328-31 (1999).
